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Chief Justice Waite and the "Twin Relic":
Reynolds v. United States
C. Peter Magrath*
In the landmark case of Reynolds v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court held that a general law prohibiting polygamy did not
abridge the religious freedom of members of the Mormon faith guaran-
teed by the first amendment. The author here explores the background
of Chief Justice Waite's opinion in Reynolds v. United States: the tenets
and development of the Mormon faith in the United States, the charac-
ter of the Waite Court, and the sources and development of Chief
justice Waite's opinion in the case.
I. Tim WA=r CouRT
Chief Justice Waite is an unknown man in popular history, but
his term as Chief Justice from 1874 to 1888 was a significant one in
our judicial history, spanning the end of Reconstruction and the be-
ginning of the first attempts to regulate the untamed forces of
American capitalism. Few men, however, have come to the Supreme
Court under less favorable circumstances than did Morrison Remick
Waite. On the day of his appointment as Chief Justice, January 19,
1874, Waite was an obscure Ohio attorney whose most newsworthy
accomplishment had been his service as the junior American counsel
in the Geneva Arbitration of 1872. Safely Republican in his politics,
Waite's primary qualification for the chief justiceship was precisely
his obscurity. Because unknown, he was uncontroversial, and the
pathetically miscast President Grant chose Waite in desperation after
a series of political blunders that had left the post vacant for over
eight months.1
The new Chief Justice faced a formidable challenge. Dubbed a
"respectable mediocrity" by the nation's press,2 Waite took his seat
on an exceptionally able Court. Two members, Samuel F. Miller and
Noah H. Swayne, had themselves schemed for the appointment.
Resentment against "His Accidency" was thinly veiled. Miller spoke
of Waite as a "sow's ear." Stephen J. Field described him as a "man
that would never have been thought of for the position by any person
except President Grant." Nathan Clifford treated him as an inter-
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Brown University.
1. MAcRATH, MomusoN R. Wxrr: Tm TBIuMP- oF CHARACTER 2-22 (1963).
2. Id. at 17.
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loper who had no right to manage the Court.3 Other colleagues in-
cluded Joseph P. Bradley, one of the most learned of the nineteenth-
century judges; and, later, Horace Gray, an experienced Massa-
chusetts judge; John Marshall Harlan, the reconstructed ex-slave-
holder; and Stanley Matthews, a neglected figure who played a
significent role in the Abolitionist movement, Republican politics, and
corporate expansion. Whatever one's evaluation of individual judges,
Bradley, Field, Gray, Harlan, and Miller were a remarkably able
collection of strong-minded men-able and also easily unmanageable.
Field especially, who believed his judicial views were divinely or-
dained, could be intensely wearing. As an exasperated Justice Gray
once put it, Field often acted like "a wild bull."4 Bradley too could
be terrible-tempered,5 and Miller's personality was marred by an
overdose of egotism.
Morrison Waite overcame his initial handicaps and quickly estab-
lished himself as the undisputed master of his Court. This is not
the place to retell the story of how effectively the onetime "respecta-
ble mediocrity" managed his brethren. It is, however, fair to point
out that when he became ill for a brief period and Samuel Miller-
Waite's most severe critic-had an opportunity to run the Court as
the senior Associate Justice, he could not control Bradley and Field;
Waite's colleagues looked forward to the return of their chief.6 Not
only did Waite manage to lead his potentially quarrelsome judicial
family with high skill, but he did so at a time when the Supreme
Court was first encountering many of the divisive problems of modern
constitutional law. With the frequent exceptions of Field and Harlan,
the Waite Court displayed unanimity on the major questions of the
day. It consistently upheld both state and federal power to regulate
the new capitalism 7 it decided a long line of difficult commerce
clause cases with a pragmatic respect for local regulatory needs as
3. Id. at 7, 107, 271.
4. KING, MELVmLLE WESTON FULLER 222 (1950).
5. Bradley's temper was sometimes monumental. One morning while dressing, he
was mulling over a problem in higher mathematics (a hobby with Bradley). Thus
preoccupied he pulled on his trousers with the opening to the back; unable to find
the buttons with which to close the fly, he became enraged and tore his trousers
apart. Letter of Benjamin Cross, Nov. 13, 1963, recalling an anecdote told by a
nephew of Bradley, Judge Eugene Stevenson of the New Jersey Court of Chancery.
On another occasion, after missing a train because of his wife's insistence that he
change into a new suit of clothes, Bradley slashed the trousers into shreds with a
penknife, muttering, "you will never compel me to miss another train." Fairman,
Mr. Justice Bradley, in MR. JUSTIcE 81 (Dunham & Kurland 1964).
6. MAGRATH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 272-74. See generally Id. at 2-51-75.
7. E.g., Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886); Stone v. Mississippi, 101




well as for the requirements of a national market;8 and, less wisely
perhaps, its narrow interpretation of the fourteenth amendment
seriously weakened federal power to protect civil rights and placed
the Negro's destiny temporarily in the often unsympathetic hands of
the states.9
An interesting index of the Waite Court's essential unity is re-
vealed by the low incidence of public dissents by the Justices.
Supreme Court conference room votes are secret, and only rarely do
even prying historians penetrate the purple curtain which masks the
judges' voting from public view. Fortunately, however, Chief Justice
Waite's personal docket books, covering the October terms 1875-
1886, have been retained within his papers. They provide a fascinat-
ing set of statistics: during these twelve terms the official United
States Reports contain 2,956 decisions with full opinions of which
only 285-9.7 per cent-resulted in a public recording of dissent by at
least one Justice. But the docket books' record of conference room
votes show approximately 1,317 cases--44 per cent-in which at least
one Justice disagreed with the private majority judgment.10
Obviously, judges may withhold dissent for any number of reasons.
They may be so heavily outvoted that they believe it futile to register
a dissenting protest. "I see nothing wrong in this except the law it
announces," Harlan jauntily noted on one of the Chief Justice's
opinions. He and Field had disagreed with the majority in confer-
ence, but both withheld dissents." On another occasion Bradley
reluctantly subscribed to one of Waite's opinions. "As the Court is
all against me in this view, and will probably be against me until
some English court takes the lead on the subject, I shall waive my
views for the present, leaving it to Congress to introduce such im-
provement of the law as it may deem expedient." 12 The conference
8. E.g., Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886); Newport &
Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U.S. 470 (1882); Pensacola Tel. Co. v.
W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876). See
generally, FRANxFuraTER, THE Co auENRcE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND
WAiTE (1937).
9. E.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); United States v. Reese,
92 U.S. 214 (1876).
10. Docket Books, Oct. Terms 1875-1886, in Legal File, "Waite Papers," Library
of Congress. These figures are approximate. My counting may be slightly inaccurate,
and the tabulation includes votes on a number of motions which the Court entertained.
Moreover, in the 1870's and 1880's, cases in which the Court divided evenly some-
times went unreported. It should also be noted that judges occasionally change their
minds between the time of a conference vote and the public announcement of a decision.
11. Legal File, Oct. Term 1886. Unless otherwise indicated, all communications to
and from Waite are located in the "Waite Papers." The opinion Harlan referred to
was prepared for Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887), involving questions of inter-
national law.
12. Legal File, Oct. Term 1886. The decision was in an admiralty suit, The
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dissent may be over a relatively unimportant point that is not worth
the bother of a public dissent. Or the judges may be so pressed for
time that they cannot prepare a proper dissent, while concluding that
a mere notation of dissent is ineffectual. In fact, because the nine-
teenth-century Court could not control the flow of business onto its
docket, it was forced to give much of its time to minor private law
cases which literally swamped the Justices. The judges very likely
had less incentive for dissenting in many of these cases: they were
all busy writing majority opinions. In a typical term a Waite Court
Justice could expect to be assigned as many as thirty opinions; in
some terms Waite assigned himself over forty opinions.13 By contrast,
last term the judges on the Warren Court wrote an average of twelve
opinions each, but they found time to write an average of 3.7 con-
curring, 7.5 dissenting, and 1.4 separate opinions.14 Today's Supreme
Court Justice is also far more self-conscious about his "place" in
history and much more anxious than his nineteenth-century prede-
cessor to record his precise judicial position in cases that come before
him. Nonethless, the substantial reduction in his opinion assign-
ments makes the proliferation of concurring and dissenting opinions
functionally possible.
These considerations undoubtedly account for much of the dis-
parity between the Waite Court's conference room votes and the public
record in the United States Reports. Even so, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the Chief Justice enjoyed marked success in holding
down the number of dissents. He deliberately sought to promote a
public image of the Supreme Court as a great and impartial forum
of justice.15 When important questions of law were at stake, Waite
was anxious to have "the unanimous judgment of the court,"16 and he
especially disliked affirming cases on an evenly divided vote. Thus,
to break a four-to-four deadlock in a case interpreting an insurance
contract, he shifted his conference room vote. "By shutting my eyes
just a little," he wrote Bradley to whom he assigned the opinion,
"I think the judgment may appear good enough."' 7  The Chief
Justice himself rarely dissented; indeed, at times he apparently shifted
his vote so that he could control the assignment of an important
opinion.
18
Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). It interpreted the common law as barring recovery of
damages for death due to negligence on the high seas or on the navigable waters of
the United States.
13. Docket Books, Oct. Terms 1875-1886, Legal File.
14. 33 U.S.L. Week 3026 (1964).
15. MAGRATH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 277-84.
16. Draft of a Letter From Waite to Bradley, Dec. 11, 1883.
17. Waite to Bradley, March 17, 1878. The case was Insurance Co. v. Eggleston,
96 U.S. 572 (1878).
18. See text accompanying note 75 infra.
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A. Rights and Liberties in the Age of Enterprise
The historic significance of the Waite Court rests with its decisions
in two major areas of public interest, those involving public regula-
tion of business and those involving civil rights. In the former the
Court, led by Waite, Bradley, and Miller, sustained the power of gov-
ernment to regulate business in the public interest, refusing to read
constitutional limitations into the vague words of the commerce
and due process clauses. Waite's opinion in Munn v. Illinois9 was
the landmark decision. Despite its de facto reversal when a new
Court majority took over in the 1890's, the Munn case and its explicit
statement of judicial self-restraint re-emerged in the 1930's as the
governing precedent in economic regulation cases.20
If the Waite Court proved hostile to the claims of business, it
was equally unsympathetic to those of Negroes who sought judicial
recognition of their national civil rights. The opinions of Waite and
Bradley squarely aligned the Court with the pro-Southern policies
of President Rutherford B. Hayes; only Justice Harlan dissented from
the Court's dilution of the fourteenth amendment's libertarian guaran-
tees.21 Today, a radically different judicial and political climate has
in effect overtumed the Waite Court's civil rights rulings, even
though the "state action" theory of the fourteenth amendment ex-
pressed in the Civil Rights Cases2 2 continues to show vitality.23
19. Supra note 7.
20. MCCLOsKEY, THE A mmucA SupnFmm COURT 111-35 (1960), and Book Review,
77 HAnv. L. REv. 1171, 1173-74 (1964), presents a contrary-and widespread-view
of the Waite Court's attitude toward business. MAGRATH, op. cit. supra note 1, at
173-249, is an attempt to rebut those constitutional historians who view the Waite
Court as a tool of post-Civil War capitalism. See also Graham, The Waite Court and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 VAD. L. REv. 525 (1964).
21. Judicial, no less than political, history requires its folk heroes, and Harlan's
colorful personality, his argument for full incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
fourteenth amendment, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605-17 (1900), and his memor-
able words in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), qualify him for this role. In
a very real sense Harlan is the honored prophet of the Warren Court. But, for
scholars at least, admiration should not obscure reality. Harlan fully accepted the
"Negro race" theory, as his comments in Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559, reveal; he joined
Field's opinion in the miscegenation case, Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883),
which established the legal category of "Negro" as an object of "reasonable" state
regulation; he voted with a unanimous Court in Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880),
a decision which guaranteed the Southern states all-white juries as long as they were
not foolish enough to make it a matter of official public policy; and he spoke for the
Court in Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899), which tacitly sustained
the right of states to segregate public schools. In his private correspondence Harlan
revealed his nineteenth-century Southern heritage: he loved to recount racial anecdotes,
and he felt no compunction about using the word "nigger." Harlan to Waite, Aug. 5,
1885 and July 18, 1887; comment on printed proof of an opinion, Legal File, Oct.
Terms 1886-87. For an analysis of Harlan see Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the
Constitutional Rights of Negroes, 66 YALE L.J. 637 (1957).
22. Supra note 9.
23. Dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 318-46
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For all its progressiveness in certain respects, the Waite Court had
little interest in the type of civil rights and liberties problem that
concerns us in the 1960's. Each age, as John P. Roche has recently
argued, defines the content of "liberty" to suit its own needs and
preconceptions. 24 In the Age of Enterprise, when most persons
thought of liberty they thought of property rights. Although Waite
and his Court believed in property rights, they emphatically rejected
Stephen J. Field's view of constitutional liberty espoused in his sul-
phuric dissents from Waite's opinions upholding business regulation.
Justice Field was sincerely convinced that he stood at the ramparts,
defending constitutional liberty against the assaults of socialism. "All
history," he wrote in one opinion, "shows that rights of persons are
unsafe where property is insecure. Protection to one goes with protec-
tion to the other; and there can be neither prosperity nor progress
where this foundation of all just government is unsettled."
21 Field
was a dissenter on the Waite Court, but after 1895 his views-or,
more accurately, those of George Spencer and William Graham Sum-
ner-became the views of most Americans. Not until the 1930's was
the content of "liberty" redefined: the impact of a disastrous economic
depression resulted in a re-evaluation of Fieldian laissez faire. At
the same time, the activities of dedicated organizations like the
American Civil Liberties Union gave an entirely new meaning to the
notion of individual liberty.26
The Waite Court showed scant interest in such modern civil liberty
questions as those involving the fairness of trials,27 the constitutionality
of anti-miscegenation laws,28 and the extent of voting rights.29 In a
few instances, it is true, the Court rendered judgments that by
modern standards are libertarian,30 but these decisions had small
(1964), a case in which the majority of the Court rejected invitations to either reverse
the Civil Rights Cases or to expand broadly the definition of "state action." See
generally, Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1083 (1960), and
Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, in THE SUPRENE Count REYV 1963
101-51 (Kurland ed. 1963).
24. RocHi, THE QuEsT FR =hE DasAm, ThE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND
HurAN RELATIONS IN MODERN AMERICA (1963).
25. Dissenting in Sinking Fund Cases, supra note 7, at 767.
26. RoctE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 142-51, 158-83.
27. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
28. Pace v. Alabama, supra note 21.
29. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875); United States v. Reese,
supra note 9.
30. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1881), limited Congress' power of
"making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen." Its force has been largely
vitiated by the ruling in McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927), that Congress
has broad authority to conduct legislative investigations. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110
U.S. 651 (1884), upheld a federal prosecution against a conspiracy to prevent Negroes
from voting in a congressional election; in Strauder v. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880),
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significance in the political context of late nineteenth-century America.
The Waite Court, in short, was consistently inhospitable to the liberty
claims that came before it-whether made by corporations, Negroes,
or individuals who alleged governmental violations of their personal
liberties. Because the modem constitutional temper is strikingly
different-so self-consciously libertarian-most of the Waite Court's
civil rights and liberties decisions are primarily interesting as museum
pieces, judicial dinosaurs that belong to a pre-modern era.
There is, however, one major exception, and it forms the main
subject of this essay. In Reynolds v. United States,31 the Court,
speaking through its Chief Justice, handed down a leading civil
liberties precedent, the Supreme Court's first interpretation of the
freedom of religion clause in the first amendment. Since the decision
sustained federal power to punish polygamous behavior, despite the
defense of religious freedom, the Reynolds opinion is hardly regarded
as a civil liberties monument by those who find constitutional comfort
in the position of Justice Hugo L. Black. Yet it introduced to American
constitutional law one of its most famous metaphors, Jefferson's "wall
of separation" between church and state; and it has won its judicial
spurs as the leading precedent on the power of public authorities to
prohibit socially deviant religious practices. It has been relied upon
by Justice Douglas,32 cited approvingly by Chief Justice Warren33
and Justices BrennanM and Frankfurter,35 and endorsed by scholars as
sensitive to questions of human liberty as Philip Kurland3 and Eugene
Rostow.3 7 Moreover, for a number of reasons the Reynolds decision
is of historic interest. Waite assigned himself the opinion after he
and apparently Bradley and Clifford shifted from a dissenting position
in the conference room vote. In preparing it, the Chief Justice
engaged in an imaginative collaboration with George Bancroft, the
and Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), the Court barred the states from overtly
excluding Negroes from jury service-decisions that were seriously compromised by
Virginia v. Rives, supra note 21, which allowed covert discrimination. In Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Court used the equal protection clause of* the
fourteenth amendment to invalidate a San Francisco ordinance that discriminated
against the owners of Chinese laundries (and of course interfered with their property
rights); and in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), it used the fourth and
fifth amendments to invalidate a section of a congressional act which forced defendants
accused of violating the customs laws to incriminate themselves.
31. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
32. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946).
33. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 559, 603-05 (1961).
34. Braunfeld v. Brown, supra note 33, at 613 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
35. McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 33, at 462 (special opinion).
36. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. Rv. 1, 8
(1961).
37. RosTow, Thr SovFRMGN PMMoGAT-VE 68-69 (1962).
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great nineteenth-century historian. Reynolds v. United States and
the subsequent Mormon cases were part of a truly remarkable chapter
in American constitutional history.
II. Tim MORMON QUESTION: SAINTS OR SINMS?
The Reynolds decision cannot be understood apart from its unique
background. Today the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints-
the faith is unofficially called Mormon after one of its holy books-
is one of America's thriving minority religions. It is strongest in its
Utah base, but Mormonism has a significant following in other states
and in foreign countries as well. Two words, "Mormon respectability,"
probably best describe its public image. Most Americans understand
little about the teachings of Prophets Joseph Smith and Brigham
Young, but they accept Mormonism as a legitimate religion whose
members are honest, peaceful, frugal, hard-working, and prosperous.
Nothing better illustrates its present status than the fact that during
the 1950's a leading figure in the Mormon Church served as Secretary
of Agriculture. Indeed, at the President's request, Cabinet meetings
in the Eisenhower era were opened with a short prayer by Apostle
Ezra Taft Benson.
It was not always so. To most nineteenth-century Americans,
Mormonism was a strange and dangerous cult of religious fanatics.
Many would have agreed with Francis Lieber, a father of American
political science, who in 1859 denounced Mormonism as a "repulsive
fraud" and "a wicked idea." 8 "Mormonism," a fashionable Chicago
preacher declared a few years later, "ought to be dynamited.' '0 The
causes behind such attitudes are not mysterious: within the context of
traditional Christianity, Mormonism was a strange cult. Its followers
believed that beginning in 1820 God had periodically communicated
with Joseph Smith. In 1827, according to Mormon belief, an angel led
Smith to a set of thin golden sheets secretly buried in the mountains
of upstate New York; Smith recorded their contents in the Book of
Mormon. Divine revelation was scarcely new, but the messages which
Prophet Smith passed on were. They need not be discussed here,40
except to note that Mormons rejected the established churches as
evil corruptions of true Christianity. They saw in the teachings of
Smith and his successor Prophet, Brigham Young, the only path to
the highest forms of heavenly salvation and labelled as "Gentiles" all
non-believers.
The revelation on plural marriage, which was not openly proclaimed
38. LmBER, ON Givi. LiBERTY AND SELF-GOVEBNmIENT 320 (2d ed. 1859).
39. WEST, KINGDoM OF THE SAINTS 322 (1957).
40. A good account may be found in O'DEA, THE MORMONS 22-40, 53-63 (1957).
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until 1852 when the Mormons were settled in Utah, best reveals the
exotic nature of Mormonism. It explains, too, why the Mormon
contact with American culture was so abrasive. According to the
Mormon faith, life on earth is a transitional stage where man, who
has a pre-woridly existence as a spirit, takes possession of his human
body. If he leads a holy life, he can look forward to afterlife in a
resurrected body containing a clean spirit. Heaven in the Mormon
view is made up of millions of worlds, and each man who attains
godhood may aspire to inhabiting his own world solely with the mem-
bers of his family. But before a spirit can make the migration from
pre-existence to a heavenly state, it must first be brought to earth-
hence the biblical command to "replenish the earth." As a conse-
quence, there exists a sort of reverse population pressure: the devout
Mormon desires many children (large families are still encouraged),
since he can thereby provide more earthly bodies for the spirits and
at the same time guarantee himself many heavenly companions in
his future world. Obviously, the more wives one had, the more
children one could father: polygamy was part of God's grand design.
A polygamous marriage, which had to be sanctioned by the higher
Mormon priesthood, was no casual affair. The ceremony was a solemn
church rite that "sealed" a man and woman in a "celestial marriage"
which joined them not "till death do us part," but for all eternity.
Mormons put forward other justifications for polygamy. They
argued that it had been practiced by the Hebrew patriarchs and even
by God and Jesus, a shocking blasphemy to most Christians. It was
also, they claimed, valuable in a household economy. They deeply
resented the common Gentile charge that the Mormon Church was
a society for the seduction of young virgins, and, as one critic put it,
Salt Lake City "the biggest whorehouse in the world."41 "God,"
Brigham Young insisted, "never introduced the patriarchical order of
marriage with a view to please man in his carnal desires, but He in-
troduced it for the express purpose of raising up to His name royal
priesthood, a peculiar people."4 With much force, Mormons further
retorted that polygamy ended spinsterhood and stopped prostitution;
a mere adulterer, they pointed out, would scarcely take on the burden-
some responsibility of additional wives and children. Above all, how-
ever, the Mormons practiced and defended polygamy because they
believed it to be an integral part of their religion. They had no
41. Quoted in WALLACE, ThE TWmrY-SEVENTH WIuE 15 (1961), a popular
biography of Ann Eliza Young, the stormy and apostate twenty-seventh wife of Brig-
ham Young. The best study of Mormon polygamy, marred only by its lack of docu-
mentation, is by Kimball Young, a professional sociologist who is a direct descendant
of Brigham Young. YOUNG, IsN'T ONE WIFE ENoucH? (1954).
42. WALLAcE, op. cit. supra note 41, at 13.
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doubt about the legality of their behavior. "The constitution and laws
of the United States being founded upon the principles of freedom,"
a Mormon publicist wrote, "do not interfere with marriage relations,
but leave the nation free to believe in and practice the doctrine of a
plurality of wives, or to confine themselves to the one wife system,
just as they choose."
43
Polygamy made Mormonism sensational, doubly so in a Victorian
age. Their creed, to paraphrase a popular quip, was singular and
their wives plural.A Books and lectures about the evils of polygamy
were a source of national titillation; a concern with polygamy was a
respectable way in which Americans could indulge in sexual day-
dreams by learning the intimate details-so they fancied it-of life in
the mysteriously exciting Mormon harems.45 But polygamy was not
the sole cause of Mormon difficulties. Even before they embraced it,
they were victims of popular prejudice and outright persecution, first
in Missouri and later in Illinois and Utah. They also had a knack for
contributing to their misfortunes. Under a special dispensation from
the Illinois government, the Mormons during the late 1830's were
allowed to run their settlement of Nauvoo as a semi-sovereign city-
state. Joseph Smith combined in his person the roles of military
commander-in-chief, mayor, and chief judge. When a dissident group
dared to publish a newspaper, The Nauvoo Expositor, challenging
some of Smith's actions, the Mayor had the City Council issue
orders condemning the Expositor as a "nuisance." It was enjoined
from further publishing, and the injunction was made operative in a
most effective way: Smith's army, the Nauvoo Legion, burned all the
copies of the Expositor they could find, destroyed the printing plant,
and smashed its type.46
In 1857 at Mountain Meadows, Utah, a Mormon band, encouraged
though not directly incited by the Church leadership, led an Indian
party in a brutal raid on a wagon train passing through the Utah
Territory. The Mormons induced the defenders to surrender under
a flag of truce, and then they and their Indian allies murdered
nearly one hundred and fifty men and women. In their defense one
might say that the Mormons had learned the harsh lessons taught
them by their tormentors. More specifically, the Mountain Meadows
43. YouNc, op. cit. supra note 41, at 45-46.
44. O'DA, op. cit. supra note 40, at 75.
45. Especially popular were the accounts of ex-Mormon women who had abandoned
their polygamous marriages. Fanny Stenhouse's TELL IT ALL, ThE SToRY Or A
WoMAN's LIFE IN POLYGAMY (1890), was a big success. So also was Ann Eliza Young's
WiFE No. 19 (1876), an account of her marriage to Brigham Young. Between 1873
and 1883 Ann Eliza delivered nearly 2,000 lectures, sometimes earning as much as
$20,000 a year. WALLACE, Op. cit. supra note 41, at 332-95.
46. ANDERSON, DEsERT SAINTS 38 (1942); O'DEA, op. cit. supra note 40, at 65-66.
[ VOL. 18
CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE
Massacre occurred on the eve of the "Utah War," a time of great
Mormon-Gentile tension, when federal troops were "invading" the
territory in an attempt to establish national authority.47 Such an
explanation, however, misses the point: neither Mormon-nor Gentile
accepted the niceties of the first amendment as part of their day-to-
day operational code. Fortunately, nineteenth-century Americans
still had plenty of room in which to spread out, leaving each group
relatively free to practice its own brand of intolerance with a mini-
mum impact on other intolerants.
The Mormons themselves had finally settled in the remote desert
of Utah. Their patriarch was Brigham Young, and under his iron-
willed leadership a theocracy was established. The Mormons were
God's chosen saints and the desert was their Zion: between 1847
and the mid-1880's the Utah Territory-its economic, social, and
political life-was under the nearly absolute domination of the cen-
tralized hierarchy of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.
For a few years Young was the federally-appointed Territorial Gover-
nor. Later, President Buchanan refused to reappoint him, and the
official administration was turned over to non-Mormons. (Their status
in the Territory was something like that of Massachusetts Republicans
in Mississippi after 1865.) None of this really mattered. The real,
if unofficial, government remained securely in the hands of a priestly
"ghost government."
Mormons outnumbered Gentiles by better than five-to-one, and
election contests were never in doubt. Ballots were marked with a
voter's registration number, making it easy for the hierarchy to check
on the political behavior of their flock. This control was probably
unnecessary anyway: the devout Mormons were more than willing to
vote as their religious leaders desired. Not surprisingly, the Territorial
Legislature and the local courts were controlled by the Church. Each
year until 1870 the ghost government conducted a one-day session
after the official legislature had adjourned, listening to a message from
"Governor" Young and ratifying the laws passed during the session!
After 1862 small contingents of federal troops were permanently
stationed in Utah. But even this reminder of Washington's authority
was challenged, for until 1870 the Church had its own army-the
13,000 member Nauvoo Legion. An uneasy truce prevailed, though
as a Mormon writer tactfully phrases it, "the Gentiles did not feel
secure with an army of thirteen thousand under control of the priest-
hood."48
With the end of Reconstruction in the mid-eighteen-seventies, "the
47. BRooms, THE MouNT.iU MEAxows MASSACRE (1950).
48. ANIFRSON, op. cit. supra note 46, at 273.
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Mormon Question" replaced "the Negro Question" as one of the
nation's political centerpieces. As with the slavery issue, though with
lesser consequences, the conflict between Mormon polygamy and
theocracy and American society was "irrepressible." In fact, most
non-Mormons regarded polygamy as a form of slavery. As early as
1856 the first Republican platform affirmed that "it is both the right
and the imperative duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories
those twin relics of barbarism-Polygamy and Slavery."49
Polygamy, like slavery, was spreading in the territories and it was
in fundamental conflict with American culture. Regardless of Mor-
mon justification as a God-given plan, most Americans saw polygamy
as an imitation of the Oriental concubines in which the women were
near-slaves. Mormon theology contributed to this impression by
frankly elevating the men to a patriarchical position. In the words of
the leading Mormon defense of polygamy:
The husband is the head of the family, and it is his duty to govern his
wife or wives, and the children, according to the laws of righteousness;
and it is the duty of his wife to be subject unto him in all things, even as
the church is subject unto Christ .... Each wife should seek counsel from
her husband, and obey the same with all meekness and all patience in all
things. 50
True, a patriarchical marriage system was not the same as slavery:
Mormon women like Eliza Young were free to quit and to make a
lucrative career out of their exposes; Southern slaves like Nat Turner
had never been quite so fortunate. Such distinctions were lost on
non-Mormons. Harriet Beecher Stowe condemned the "degrading
bondage" of polygamy as vigorously as she once blasted Negro slavery.
It was, she declared, "a cruel slavery whose chains have cut into the
very hearts of thousands of our sisters"; and, like slavery, it was
doomed to perish before the forces of enlightenment.
51
Mormons had a point when they scored those "who brand our wives
as prostitutes, children as bastards, while at the same time they
themselves are supporters of harlots."52 In Utah the brothels, gambling
dens, and saloons were owned and patronized by Gentiles-in whose
morality the federal government was quite uninterested. Yet, for all
49. PoRTEm & JOHNsON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1960 27 (1961). The
denunciation of polygamy reappeared in the 1876 platform. By 1880 the Republican
platform was calling for both the suppression of polygamy and the divorce of "the
political power from the ecclesiastical power of the so-called Mormon church"-to be
enforced, if necessary, by "military authorities." Id. at 74.
50. YouNG, op. cit. supra note 41, at 50, quoting "Celestial Marriage," a long defense
of polygamy prepared by Orson Pratt in 1852 at the request of Brigham Young.
51. Preface to STENHOTUSE, op. cit. supra note 45, at vi.
52. Quoted in YouNG, op. cit. supra note 41, at 55.
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the Gentile hypocrisy, American social and religious morality did
strongly condemn extra-marital sexual relations and it was a violation
of the deepest cultural and legal mores of European and Anglo-
American civilization for a man to have more than one wife at one
time. As a matter of fact, while most Mormons defended polygamy,
the vast majority of them lived in monogamy. Many could not afford
more than one wife, but, either consciously or unconsciously, many
who could have taken on additional wives used the economic excuse
to remain monogamous.3 Kimball Young in his study also found that
many polygamous Mormons had suppressed guilt feelings about their
plural marriages, reflecting the moral values of American culture at
large. And in most polygamous households the first wife-the legal
wife by American standards-enjoyed a higher status than the plural
wives. 4
If polygamy was at war with some of our deepest cultural instincts,
theocracy was irreconcilable with American democracy. When the
Mormons migrated to Utah, they mistakenly believed they were going
into uncontrolled Mexican territory where they would be free to
govern themselves. Instead, they soon learned that the treaties which
ended the Mexican War again placed them under the jurisdiction of
the United States. Nor-apart from their desire to run Zion according
to the Book of Mormon-did they really want to cut themselves off
from the United States. By reasons of culture, tradition, and economic
self-interest the Mormons were Americans. They remained neutral
during the Civil War, but the Mormons duly celebrated American
independence every Fourth of July; and they joyfully welcomed the
completion in 1869 of the transcontinental railroad at Promontory
Point, Utah, which linked them to the national markets to their east
and west. They acted like typical Americans, too, when they defended
their right to practice polygamy by invoking the Constitution as well
as the laxys of God.
Still, their polygamy and the semi-theocracy under which they lived
53. Accurate statistics on the number of polygamists are not available, but the
number was comparatively low. O'DEA, op. cit. supra note 40, at 246, estimates that
about eight per cent of the Mormon men had plural wives. (The Mormon population
of Utah in the 1870's was 120,000.) ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 46, at 394-98,
studied United States Census Bureau records for selected southern Utah counties,
concluding that there was "but a small number of polygamists" in that remote area-
perhaps one polygamous family to every ten monogamous ones.
54. Youno, op. cit. supra note 41, at 291-93. Young also shows that many Mormon
men and women bad difficulty in adjusting to a passionless polygamy. It conflicted
with the American notion of romantic love in which a single man and woman are the
central objects of each others' attention. The successful polygamous marriages were
those in which the husband and his plural wives were able to replace the ideal of




placed the Mormons beyond the cultural and political tolerance of
their fellow Americans. Six times between 1859 and 1887 they
petitioned for statehood; six times they were rejected. Enough has
been written to sketch the dimensions of the "Mormon Question." As
gentle a man as President Rutherford B. Hayes could enter these
words in his diary on January 13, 1880:
Now the [Utah] Territory is virtually under the theocratic government
of the Mormon Church. The union of church and state is complete. The
result is the usual one, the usurpation or absorption of all temporal authority
and power by the church. Polygamy and every other evil sanctioned by
the church is safe. To destroy the temporal power of the Mormon Church
is the end in view. This requires agitation. The people of the United States
must be made to appreciate, to understand, the situation. Laws must be
enacted which will take from the Mormon Church its temporal power.
Mormonism as a sectarian idea is nothing, but as a system of government
it is our duty to deal with it as an enemy to our institutions, and its sup-
porters and leaders as criminals.5
Destruction of the "enemy" was in fact just around the corner; within
precisely ten years polygamy would be repudiated and the political
power of the priesthood crushed. The first blow had already been
struck just one year before. In 1879 in Reynolds v. United States the
Supreme Court denied constitutional sanction to the "twin relic"
and cleared the decks for an all-out federal assault against the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.
A. The Reynolds Decision: One Man, One Woman
The federal government began its campaign against Mormon poly-
gamy as far back as 1862. Asserting its power to govern the territories,
Congress in that year passed the Morrill Act which invalidated all
Utah laws that "establish, support, maintain, shield, or countenance
polygamy." The act further provided that:
Every person having a husband or wife living, who shall marry any
other person, whether married or single, in a Territory . . . or other place
over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, shall . . . be
adjudged guilty of bigamy, and shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
five hundred dollars, and by imprisonment for a term of not exceeding
five years....56
For over a decade the Morrill Act went unenforced as Washington
preoccupied itself with the Civil War and Reconstruction; there was
not a single prosecution for polygamy. But by the 1870's President
55. 3 HAYEs, DLAny AND L-rnms OF RuTrlEnRorD BIcR-ARD HAYES 584 (Williams
ed. 1924).
56. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501.
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Grant was asking for new legislation against the "remnant of bar-
barism, repugnant to civilization, decency, and to the law of the
United States."57 Congress responded with the Poland Act of 1874
which divested the Mormon-controlled probate courts of their power
to hear civil, chancery, and criminal actions; it transfered jurisdiction
over all important cases to the federal territorial courts.58
Because both sides were eager to determine the effectiveness of the
anti-polygamy law, federal and Mormon officials informally agreed to
a test case.59 George Reynolds, personal secretary to Brigham Young,
was chosen as the guinea pig. He had recently taken a second wife
and in October, 1874, was indicted for bigamy. Reynolds was con-
victed, but the Utah Territorial Supreme Court voided the conviction
on the ground that the grand jury which indicted him had been
improperly constituted.60 He was retried, again convicted, and
sentenced to a five hundred dollar fine and to two years at hard labor.
This time the Territorial Supreme Court upheld the conviction;
61 on
October 4, 1876, Reynolds appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
Throughout the proceedings Reynolds' attorneys set up two broad
defenses. The first was procedural, and it is evident that it-not the
religious question-gave the federal courts the most difficulty. The
essence of the procedural argument was that the methods by which
Reynolds was convicted violated federal law. In particular, in both
the first and second trials, he claimed that the size and composition
of the grand and petit juries were illegal (the trial judge had sustained
all prosecution motions to disqualify Mormon veniremen for bias);
and he claimed that the prosecution had been improperly allowed to
introduce the evidence which proved the second and bigamous mar-
riage. Reynolds also insisted that the trial judge exceeded his powers
when he charged the jury to "consider what are to be the conse-
quences to the innocent victims of this [polygamous] delusion." The
"innocent children" and "pure-minded women," he charged, were the
real "sufferers" and the suffering would increase if polygamy were
not checked.62
Reynolds' second defense was religious. His Church credentials
were impeccable: he had been a Mormon for twelve years, and his
second marriage had been approved by the hierarchy. His witnesses
57. YoumN, op. cit. supra note 41, at 348.
58. Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 469, § 3, 18 Stat. 253.
59. The first Reynolds case was a pre-arranged affair; the second one was not.
5 RoBERTs, A CoaRBEHENsrvE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JEsus CmuST OF LATnE-
DAY SAINTs 468-70 (1930).
60. United States v. Reynolds, 1 Utah 226 (1874).
61. United States v. Reynolds, 1 Utah 319 (1876).
62. Record pp. 28-29, United States v. Reynolds, supra note 31.
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included Orson Pratt, the author of "Celestial Marriage," and Daniel
H. Wells, a prominent Mormon who once commanded the Nauvoo
Legion. These Church leaders testified that the failure of male
members, when circumstances permitted, to practice polygamy-a
command of God-would lead to punishment and "damnation in the
life to come."63 Reynolds tacitly accepted the constitutionality of the
Morrill Act, but denied that it could be applied to him:
A person non compos mentis can have no guilty intention. One who does
the act involuntarily is free from criminality. One who commits or
abstains from an act under a belief that it is God's will that he should do
so, is free from guilt. So here, one who contracts the relation forbidden by
statute, in the belief that it is not only pleasing to the Almighty, but that
it is positively commanded, cannot have the guilty mind which is essential
to the commission of a crime.... [He] cannot be CRIMINALLY responsi-
ble, since guilty intent is not only consciously absent, but there is present
a positive belief that the act complained of is lawful, and even acceptable
to the Deity.64
The argument concluded with the disarming statement that, while
"this line of reasoning may make it difficult to deal criminally with
certain (supposed) infractions of the moral law . . . it is none the
less logical and convincing."65
It is, of course, the problem of religious freedom, so starkly pre-
sented by the Reynolds case, which interests us most; in any similar
case today it would be one of the central issues.66 But until Chief
Justice Waite wrote his opinion, the religious freedom question was
muted-a good indication of how unaccustomed most nineteenth-cen-
tury Americans were to thinking in terms of the first amendment. In
the first Reynolds case the Utah Supreme Court brusquely announced
that the religious plea was "based upon neither reason, justice nor
law, and therefore we dismiss it without further notice."67 True to
its promise, the territorial court completely ignored that issue the
second time the case was before it.68 In his brief to the Supreme
Court the Solicitor General of the United States revealed how much
weight he assigned to the religious freedom question: he lumped it
together with three other minor exceptions which "do not call for any
63. Id. pp. 18-19.
64. Brief of Plaintiff-in-Error pp. 56-57, United States v. Reynolds, supra note 31.
65. Id. at p. 57.
66. See Cleveland v. United States, supra note 32 (Mann Act prosecution of
Fundamentalist Mormons for practicing polygamy); Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95
(1948) (state prosecution for advocating polygamy); and People v. Woody, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964) (state prosecution of members of a sect which uses
mescaline as an essential part of religious ceremony).
67. United States v. Reynolds, 1 Utah 226 (1874).




On the other side, the attorneys for Reynolds directed almost all of
their fire to alleged errors in the trial. In a brief of sixty-three pages
they gave little more than five to the question of religious freedom.
The first amendment is nowhere mentioned, nor is there any discus-
sion of the meaning of religious freedom under the Constitution.
There is only the assertion that "the genius of the Constitution" forbids
Congress to enact "arbitrary" territorial legislation, an argument in
behalf of self-government in the territories, and the defense that
Reynolds' religious convictions immunized his actions from the evil
intent needed to sustain a conviction."'
Under these circumstances it is nothing but remarkable that in
Reynolds v. United States the Supreme Court produced what has
become the leading constitutional precedent on the free exercise clause
of the first amendment. While the reasons are not certain in every
detail, much of the answer is supplied by the Waite Papers. The
Reynolds case was argued on November 14 and 15, 1878, and it
was followed by an extremely close conference room vote on the
sixteenth. Justices Miller, Swayne, Strong, Hunt, and Harlan voted
to affirm the Utah court; the Chief Justice, Clifford, Field, and
Bradley voted to reverse. 71 Yet the Chief Justice's docket book lists
him as the one assigned to prepare the opinion, and it further notes
that on January 4, 1879, the Court approved his opinion affirming
Reynolds' conviction. It was announced on January 6, with only
Justice Field dissenting from one of the points in Waite's opinion.
It is almost certain that the four votes to reverse cast on November
16 were motivated by doubts that the Reynolds trial had violated
federal law. It was these questions which attracted almost all of the
attention in the courts below and in the briefs presented by the
opposing sides. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Justice
Field, the only one of the four conference room dissenters to note
publicly his disagreement, based his partial dissent from the Reynolds
judgment solely on a question as to the admissibility of some of the
testimony. He uttered not a word on the religious issue. 2 Equally
suggestive is the fact that in none of the subsequent Mormon cases to
reach the Court during the next decade did any one of the Justices
show the slightest concern about possible violations of the first
amendment, even though the questions presented by some of these
cases were far graver than those in Reynolds
& 3
69. Brief for the United States p. 8, United States v. Reynolds, supra note 31.
70. Brief of Plaintiff-in-Error pp. 52-57, United States v. Reynolds, supra note 31.
71. Docket Book, Oct. Term 1878.
72. Supra note 31, at 168.
73. Infra, 49-54. This was particularly true in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890),
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We cannot know why Bradley and Clifford shifted (or, alterna-
tively, why they silently acquiesced in the judgment), but Waite very
likely, shifted because of a combination of reasons. Quite possibly his
friendship with George Bancroft sparked his interest in the religious
issue.74 The most likely causes, however, were probably his dislike
of close decisions and the fact that he felt an especially strong re-
sponsibility in the assignment of opinions in constitutional cases. In
1881 he compiled a memorandum of significant constitutional cases
that had been decided since his appointment: of the seventy-two
cases he listed Waite aligned himself with the majority-and thus
controlled the assignment of opinion-in all but six. The assignments,
moreover, were consistently given to the Court's strongest members."
Reynolds was one of the significant cases.
However troubled he may have been at first, the Chief Justice's
opinion disposed of the procedural issues to the satisfaction of all the
brethren except Justice Field. Perhaps by "shutting" his "eyes just a
little"76 Waite felt that the disputed points could be resolved in favor
of the United States. In any event Reynolds v. United States accepted
the legality of the Utah territorial law which limited grand juries to
fifteen members, instead of the sixteen to twenty-three required in the
courts of the United States.77 It sustained the composition of the petit
jury, including the government's challenges for cause against all jurors
who were living or had lived in polygamy.7 18 It ruled that the vital
testimony establishing the fact of Reynolds' first marriage, given by
his second and "illegal" wife in the first trial, could be admitted in
the second trial. The record showed that the accused was responsible
for the disappearance of Mrs. Reynolds number two. Waite declared
that there was no unfairness in the admission of her testimony; the
governing maxim, he wrote, was that "no one shall be permitted to
take advantage of his wrong.... ."19 Finally, the Court saw "no just
cause for complaint" in that part of the trial judge's charge which
directed the jury to keep in mind the effects of polygamy. Congress,
he said, believed that polygamy had "evil consequences," and all that
the judge did "was to call the attention of the jury to the peculiar
character of the crime for which the accused was on trial, and to
and Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). It is worth noting that the Court opinions in these cases
were delivered by Justices Field and Bradley, two of the conference room dissenters
in the Reynolds case.
74. See pp. 525-29 infra.
75. MAGRATH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 263.
76. See text accompanying notes 17 & 18 supra.
77. Supra note 31, at 154.
78. Id. at 154-57.
79. Id. at 159. This was the point on which Justice Field dissented.
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remind them of the duty they had to perform."80
Although there is no specific proof, the circumstantial evidence
strongly suggests that the Chief Justice was deeply interested in the
religious questions raised by the trial of George Reynolds. Fully half
of Waite's Reynolds opinion was devoted to an examination of the
meaning of religious freedom under the Constitution, a sharp contrast
with the casual treatment of this question at all other stages of the
proceedings.8' Waite's discussion of the first amendment was not,
however, obiter dicta: the religious question was squarely in the
record, and it was after all at the root of the case. To Mormons the
practice of polygamy was an integral part of their theology. The
claim that the Constitution gave them the right to live in conformity
with the laws of God was their most popular defense. As one Mormon
spokesman said, "The controversy is with God, not us."
2
Morrison Waite himself was a God-fearing man and active in the
Episcopal Church, yet he made little show of his beliefs and was
tolerant of those of others. On the other hand, every facet of his
value system and political background pointed to his hbstility toward
Mormon polygamy. He had been a Republican since the days when
the "twin relic" first became a party issue. He was a friend and
political admirer of President Rutherford Hayes, whose views of
Reconstruction and the corrupting effect of unchecked corporate
power he broadly shared.83 One doubts that he felt very differently
about polygamy and theocracy. Strongly sympathetic to the cause of
equal treatment for women, the Chief Justice unquestionably took a
dim view of the subservient status of women in Mormon society. 4
Within the context of Waite's value system, the attempt to crush
polygamy was unquestionably a progressive reform.
Apart from these background influences, the immediate direction
of Waite's handling of the religious question was shaped by his friend-
ship with the American historian, George Bancroft. Bancroft was a
nineteenth-century Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.: in the course of a long
and eventful career he had written a monumental ten volume history
of the United States,u played a leading part in Jacksonian Demociatic
politics, and served as Secretary of the Navy under Polk and as John-
80. Id. at 168.
81. One could argue that Waite's discussion of the free exercise clause reflected his
own initial doubts as to the legitimacy of the federal prosecution, that he was arguing
to convince himself. For the reasons indicated in this paragraph and the next, I do
not believe this would be a reasonable inference.
82. WALLAcE, op. cit. supra note 41, at 13.
83. MAGRATH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 151-71, 206-08.
84..Id. at 119.
85. BANCnoFT, HISTORY OF HE UNITED STATES FROm THE DiscovEay oF TH
CoNTNETmrr (1834-1875). The History went through twenty-five various editions.
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son's and Grant's Minister to Prussia. In the seventies and eighties he
lived in semi-retirement in Washington, preparing a history of the
American Constitution." His prestige was enormous, his presence at
dinner gatherings a coup for any host: in an unprecedented gesture the
Senate in 1879 voted him the full privileges of the Senate floor.87
During his first years on the Court Waite lived on H Street next
door to the elder statesman. He leased the home of J. C. B. Davis,
Bancroft's nephew who was an intimate friend of the Chief Justice
and who later became the Court Reporter. Before long the historian
was describing himself as on "the most friendly terms" with Waite;
the Chief Justice spoke of Bancroft as "the greatest of favorites" in
Washington society.88 Bancroft himself entertained freely. For in-
stance, President Hayes recorded in his diary "a delightful dinner
party" at the historian's home in which eighteen guests, including
Waite, listened as Bancroft "spoke of Washington's love of the Union,
his support of John Adams in preference to Thomas Jefferson because
of his Union sentiments."89
When Waite began preparing the Reynolds opinion, he turned to
Bancroft for information about the original intent behind the religion
clause of the first amendment-still constitutional terra incognita in
the 1870's.90 On December 2, 1878, Bancroft responded with two
pieces of information. The first was a copy of a letter from Joseph
Hawley to the Massachusetts Senate in 1780, declining the seat to
which he had been elected. While a devout Congregationalist, Hawley
was a genuine eighteenth century libertarian, and he repudiated as
absurd," "ipolitick," "unnighteous," "unconscionable," and "dishon-
orable," a provision in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 which
required members of the General Court to make a profession of their
Christian faith before taking their seats.91 The second place of infor-
mation that Bancroft passed on to Waite was a reference to Jefferson's
Statute on Religious Freedom:
86. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FOnR.MATON OF THE CONSTnrION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (6th ed. 1893).
87. NYE, GEORGE BAzcnoFr, BRAwnN REBEL 294 (1944).
88. Bancroft to Davis, 1875, undated, "J. C. Bancroft Davis Papers," Library of
Congress; Waite to Davis, May 24, 1875.
89. Feb. 23, 1878. 3 HAYES, op. cit. supra note 55, at 461.
90. The request must have been oral; there is no Waite to Bancroft letter in the
file of outgoing correspondence which is complete for this period.
91. Hawley's classic rejoinder deserves to be quoted: "Did our Father Confessors
imagine, that a man who had not so much fear of God in his heart, as to restrain him
from acting dishonestly and knavishly in the trust of a Senator or Representative would
hesitate a moment to subscribe that declaration? Cui bone then is the Declaration?"
Joseph Hawley's Criticism of the Constitution of Massachusetts, in 3 SlnTH COLLEGE
STmrs IN HISToRY 53 (Clune ed. 1917). Hawley was a figure of some importance in
his day. See BROwN, JOSEPH HAwLEY, COLONIAL RADICAL (1931).
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The Virginia law, which guided the Virginia members of the conven-
tion,9 2 shows the opinion of the leading American Statesmen in 1785. It
is found in Hening's Virginia Statutes at large XII. 84-86. It was accepted
alike by the friends of Jefferson, and the Presbyterians of Virginia.
93
Bancroft covered these events in his history of the Constitution
which he was then writing. He praised Hawley's letter and discussed
the disestablishment of religion in Virginia during the 1780's, showing
his great sympathy for the concept of religious liberty represented by
Jefferson's statute.94 Bancroft, who was a Unitarian transcendentalist,
made clear his own view on the meaning of religious freedom. It
meant the separation of church and state and "the management of
temporal things" by "the temporal power."9 5 But it also meant
absolute liberty for "the citadel of conscience, the sanctuary of the
soul." In America, he wrote, the church member was to be "subject
to no supervision but of those with whom he had entered into cove-
nant. The temporal power might punish the evil deed, but not punish
or even search after the thought of the mind."96
Waite's discussion of the free exercise clause did not refer to
Hawley, but the Reynolds opinion shows his indebtedness to Bancroft.
The Chief Justice warmly acknowledged his neighbor's aid. Writing to
him on January 4, 1879, he "again" expressed "my thanks for the
information given as to the history of the free religion clause in the
constitution." "With your assistance," he continued, "I have been able
to set forth, somewhat clearly I hope, the scope and effect of that pro-
vision."97 It would, however, be wrong in the extreme to conclude that
Bancroft dictated the Chief Justice's opinion. Waite characteristically
sought assistance from any possibly useful source. Thus, in preparing
an opinion in a case involving matters of international law, he asked
questions of John Bassett Moore, then an assistant in the State Depart-
ment, examined twenty-two scholarly authorities, and looked at
twenty United States treaties with foreign nations.9 8 He also went to
92. A reference to the Virginia convention of 1788, which ratified the new federal
constitution but proposed its amendment by the addition of a twenty-section bill of
rights.
93. Bancroft to Waite, Dec. 2, 1878.
94, 1 BANcaoFr, op. cit. supra note 86, at 210-217.
95. 2 Id. at 326.
96. 1 Id. at 212.
97. Waite to Bancroft, Jan. 4, 1879. Massachusetts Historical Society.
98. Moore to Waite, Dec. 8, 28, 1886, and a memorandum on the case, all in Legal
File, Oct. Terms 1886-87. The case was Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887). Waite's
last opinion, which dealt with the exceedingly complex and technical questions raised
by the suits over the infringements of the Bell telephone patents, is similarly a model
of responsible scholarship. The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888). He spent
months working on the opinion and educated himself on the principles of electricity.
See MAcnATv, op. cit. supra note 1, at 309, and the Letter From Ainsworth R.
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persons whom he respected. He was a good lawyer and a literate
man,99 and he was intelligent-intelligent enough to consult able
people when he prepared opinions on unfamiliar subjects. He was
particularly close to Justice Bradley, the Court's most learned member,
whose suggestions appear in many of Waite's opinions: Munn v.
Illinois' was as much Bradley's as Waite's opinion.''
But Waite was no man's puppet. Others came to him as well.
Harlan, for example, did in 1881 when he was writing an opinion in
what he described as a "grave" municipal bond case. "You are often
very happy," the Justice wrote him, "in stating concisely a rule or
principle, and if it occurs to you, without taking much time, how
the rule should be stated in this case, I would be glad to have your
views." 02 Waite, moreover, used the information he acquired as he
saw fit. "I send you a copy of the [Reynolds] opinion," he told Ban-
croft, "that you may see what use has been made of your facts."'10 3
Facts and opinions, we know, are rarely wholly separable, but the
Chief Justice put his own imprint on the materials supplied to him.
On another occasion Waite rejected Bancroft's advice, despite the
historian's passionate conviction, that the Constitution, if "rightly
interpreted," forbade the federal government from making paper
money legal tender.104 Under the skin Bancroft was still a states'
rights Democrat, and he had always been a hard-money man. The
Waite Court's ruling in Julliard v. Greenman'0 5 that Congress had the
implied power to make Treasury notes legal tender in times of peace
as well as of war aroused the old historian. Waite had arranged for
him to be in Court the day that the lulliard opinion was announced.
Spofford, the Librarian of Congress, Jan. 7, 1888, informing Waite that he will, if
necessary, order a copy of "Ferguson's Electricity" from New York.
99. He regularly requested such books as CuTsis, HIsTORY OF THE OIGiN, FonmA-
TION AND ADOPTION OF THE CoNsTrruTioN (1854-1858); HOLST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AND POLrnicAL HISTORY OF THE UNrrIED STATES (1877-1892); TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (various editions since 1838). Waite to Spofford, May 16,
1878, is typical.
100. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
101. MACRAT , op. cit. supra note 1, at 182-84.
102. Harlan to Waite, Aug. 20, 1881. The case, Insurance Co. v. Bruce, 105 U.S.
328 (1882), was eventually decided on narrower grounds than Harlan had originally
indicated in his letter to Waite.
103. Waite to Bancroft, Jan. 17, 1879.
104. 2 BANcmoFr, op. cit. supra note 86, at 132-139. Paper money "is the favorite
of those who seek gain without willingness to toil; it is the deadly foe of industry."
Id. at 135. Bancroft's evidence showed only that under the Constitution, article I,
section 10, the states were forbidden to issue "bills of credit"; his argument against
federal power to issue paper money was based solely on implication. Since, Bancroft
implied, the framers regarded paper money as a "ruinous expedient," they could not
have intended to give this power to Congress. See also, NYE, op. cit. supra note 87, at
294-95.
105. 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
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The result was a shock: "I never in my life," he wrote Waite, "have
been so surprised as when I caught the nature of the decision of the
Court." He was especially chagrined because the Court rejected the
conclusions which he expressed in his History of the Constitution.
"[T]he ground which I took," he informed Waite,
is the only correct one. The historian like the judge must strive for im-
partiality, and the only way in which impartiality can be obtained is to
seek the truth for the sake of truth. The historian like the judge must be
superior to prepossession and to pride of opinion.... I do not myself think
there is any doubt whatever about the meaning of the constitution [on the
subject of paper money] . ... 106
Bancroft and Waite, however, shared the same "truth"--or was it
the same "prepossession?"-i Reynolds v. United States. In rejecting
the religious defense of George Reynolds, the Chief Justice first
paraphrased the first amendment, noting that the word "religion" is
not defined. Unable to define the indefinable, he in effect shifted his
inquiry to an examination of "religious freedom" whose meaning he
sought in "the history of the times in the midst of which the provision
was adopted." 107 Waite briefly noted the old colonial practices which
mingled state and church-public taxation for religious purposes
and punishment of heretics-and cited their demise in the post-
Revolutionary period. The Virginia experience, Waite argued, was
typical, and he quoted Madison's statement in his famous "Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments" that "religion, or
the duty we owe the Creator," was beyond the power of the civil
authority.10 8
In addition, Waite discussed two of Jeffersons contributions which
indicate "the true distinction between what properly belongs to the
church and what to the State." 1°9 One was the preamble to the
Virginia Statute on Religious Freedom which he quoted:
That to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of
opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on sup-
position of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys
all religious liberty .... [I]t is time enough for the rightful purposes of
civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into
overt acts against peace and good order.110
106. Bancroft to Waite, May 6, 1884, in HowE, THE LIFE AND Lm-rs OF GEORGE
BANcnoRFT 298-99 (1908). Although he and the Chief Justice remained friends,
Bancroft was really exorcised; two years later he published a pamphlet severely criti-
cizing the Court's opinion. BANcRoFT, A PLEA FOR THE CONSTr=TUTON OF THE UNrrED
STATES, Woux _DE IN TnE HousE OF rrs GuARDuANs (1886).
107. 98 U.S. at 162.




After tracing the demands by Jefferson and others for a religious
guarantee in the federal constitution, Waite again quoted the Sage of
Monticello, turning to the letter of 1802 to the Danbury Baptists. In it
Jefferson contemplated "with sovereign reverence" the first amendment
because it built "a wall of separation between Church and State."
"[R]eligion," Jefferson further declared, "is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God"; as for "the legislative powers of govern-
ment," these "reach actions only, and not opinions.""' These words,
Waite added, "may be accepted as almost an authoritative declaration
of the scope and effect" of the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment. "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of
social duties or subversive of good order."
12
The framework was now erected and the categories-"mere opinion"
versus "subversive actions'"-set; all that remained was to fit Reynolds'
behavior into the proper slot. The Chief Justice had little difficulty
in assigning polygamous marriage to the second category. Polygamy,
Waite argued, was "odius" to Western nations. The taking of a second
wife-bigamy-had long been a serious crime under the English com-
mon law." 3 It was forbidden in all of the American states; the Vir-
ginia legislature, for example, soon after enacting Jefferson's Statute
on Religious Freedom made bigamy a crime punishable by death. 14
But the state, Waite went on, had an even more fundamental claim:
not only was marriage a civil contract that could be regulated by law,
but the form of marriage within a society determined its political
structure. Here Waite was following the political "science" of his day,
in particular Francis Lieber, from whom he drew the conclusion that
"polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle" and "when applied to
large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while
that principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy."" 5
Indeed! One almost wishes this were true-that democracy flourishes
where monogamy prevails-and that the Soviet Union, and the United
States were sister democracies. Yet Waite was not entirely wrong
either: Mormon women were in a subservient status, and the quasi-
111. Id. at 164. Exactly how Waite came across the letter to the Danbury Baptists
is not clear. Bancroft may have referred him to it in a conversation, or Waite, who
worked very systematically, may have decided to track down Jefferson's later state-
ments on the first amendment once he had looked at the Virginia Statute on Religious
Freedom.
112. Ibid.
113. Id. at 164-65.
114. Id. at 165; Act of Dec. 8, 1788, 12 Hening's Stat. 691.
115. 98 U.S. at 166. Waite was paraphrasing Lieber. On Lieber see text accompany-
ing note 38 supra. His belief that monogamous marriage is the seedbed of the civilized
democratic state is developed in 1 LIEBE, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETIcs 155-60
(1838). See also FmUmEL, FRANCIS LiEBER 155-56 (1947).
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theocracy in Utah was scarcely attuned to the American system of
government.
Insofar as Reynolds distinguishes mere "opinion" from "action," it
is a weak analysis of free exercise problems. Almost all significant
religious expression is related to action of some kind-the conduct
of ceremonies, the printing and distribution of tracts, or the operation
of church day or Sunday schools. But the opinion, a libertarian one
in many respects, assures freedom to religious beliefs and to religious
actions, except where the latter conflict with general public regula-
tions. The laws against bigamy were of uniform and general applica-
tion, and no one really challenged their validity. Could, Waite asked,
"those who make polygamy a part of their religion" be exempted from
their operation? His answer needs to be quoted in full:
If they are [exempted], then those who do not make polygamy a part of
their religious belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who
do, must be acquitted and go free. This would be introducing a new
element into criminal law. Laws are made for the government of actions,
and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions,
they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices
were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended
that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to
prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to bum
herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the
power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into
practice?
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive
dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall
not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because
of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect
to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could
exist only in name under such circumstances. 116
Philip Kurland has made the point-correctly-that the Reynolds
doctrine, while basically sound, is "tainted" by an untenable dicho-
tomy between "action" and "belief. "117 Nevertheless, the entire
context of the Reynolds opinion, the fact that the statute against
bigamy can be defended as a general regulation well within the
traditional legislative power, and the care with which Waite chose
his illustrations makes the core logic of Reynolds v. United States
irrefutable: religious "opinion" is not subject to Caesar's command;
religious "action" is, but only when it runs afoul of otherwise valid
nondiscriminatory general public laws-that is, laws which do not
intentionally discriminate against either all churches or against a
116. 98 U.S. 166-67.
117. KuRLAND, op. cit. supra note 36, at 78.
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specific sect." 8 Any other alternative would produce chaos. Perhaps
our legislatures should not pass laws that embody certain moral judg-
ments-that bigamy and murder are wrong, that citizens must pay
taxes to provide a minimum level of social welfare, or that to deny
Negroes their civil rights is a crime. As individuals we may dislike
some of the particular moral judgments embodied in legislation and
in the common law, but we cannot escape the fact that much of our
law will reflect the moral judgments of our society. Dean Rostow,
moreover, is surely correct when he argues that "the common morality
of a society at any time is a blend of custom and conviction, or
reason and feeling, of experience and prejudice .... [I]n the life of
the law, especially in a common law country, the customs, the com-
mon views, and the habitual patterns of the people's behavior properly
count for much."" 9 Furthermore, so long as government is conceded
the power to govern meaningfully, its general laws must be applicable
to all. The Amish must pay Social Security taxes,20 Christian
Scientists must submit to public health laws designed to limit the
spread of contagious diseases, 121 Jehovah's Witnesses can be given
blood transfusions against their will to save their lives or those of their
unborn children, 122 and Orthodox Jews, whose religion forbids them
to work on Saturday, can be compelled to close their business estab-
lishments on Sunday-the common day of rest-despite the burden
this imposes on them.'2
118. It is evident that the anti-bigamy Morrill Act was aimed at Mormon polygamy,
but the law embodied the general social and legal mores of American society. In
immediate intent it was discriminatory; in broad cause and effect it was not.
119. RosTow, op. cit. supra note 37, at 78.
120. Cited in Roche, Book Review, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 406, 413 n.18 (1963).
121. 2 SToKEs, CnURCH AND STATE 1N THE UNITED STATES 323-25 (1950).
122. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1962, p. 43, col. 3; June 18, p. 1, col. 3; 19, p. 33, col. 7;
1964; 32 U.S.L. WE=K 2389-90 (1964).
123. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). While it is my belief that the
Braunfeld ruling is constitutionally correct, the wisest public policy is that which more
and more states are adopting-to exempt from the Sunday laws merchants whose shops
are closed on their Sabbath. The near impossibility of developing a satisfactory con-
stitutional theology in this area has recently been again demonstrated by the disposition
of the peyote cases in the California courts. Peyote, a non-habit forming drug composesd
primarily of mescaline, plays a central role in the religious ceremonies of the Native
American Church, an Indian sect whose membership ranges from 30,000 to 250,000
members. Its members believe that the taking of peyote, which produces hallucinations,
puts them into direct contact with God. The federal government does not classify
peyote as a narcotic, but a few states, including California, forbid its use. Religious
News Service, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1964, p. 16, col. 3. In People v. Woody, supra
note 66, the California Supreme Court overturned the conviction of three Navajo
Indians who used peyote because the state failed to show a "compelling state
interest" sufficient to justify infringement of "the theological heart of the Indians'
religion." Id. at 76, 394 P.2d at 820. The compelling-state-interest test was used
by the United States Supreme Court, two Justices dissenting, to exempt a Seventh
Day Adventist from one of the requirements of a state unemployment compensation
law. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The same logic presumably governed
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The immediate consequence of Reynolds v. United States'm was a
two-year prison sentence for George Reynolds. Four months after
the decision, on a petition for rehearing, the Supreme Court ordered
the Utah courts to adjust Reynolds' sentence; he had been wrongly
sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor in spite of the fact that the
only penalties of the Morrill Act were fines and imprisonment. In
1888 Reynolds, who died in 1909 at the age of sixty-seven, published
a book on the subject of his holy scripture, The Story of the Book of
Mormon. Only eight years ago, a publisher in Salt Lake City-the
earthly Zion of Elder George Reynolds-reissued the book in a new
edition.2 5
On his part, Chief Justice Waite took pride in the Reynolds opinion.
writing to a cleric friend he described it as "my sermon on the religion
of polygamy," adding tongue-in-cheek, "I hope you will not find it
poisoned with heterdoxy."'12 Justice Harlan told him, "It suits me as
it is," and he complimented the Chief Justice for an opinion "credita-
ble to you and to the court."12 7 The New York Times, reflecting a
common sentiment, hailed Reynolds v. United States as "A Blow At
Polygamy," the last of "the twin relics of barbarism." "A great gain'"
said the Times, "has been secured in the organized effort to crush out
polygamy in Utah." 28  The Supreme Court and the nation were
the Supreme Court's per curiam reversal of a Minnesota criminal contempt conviction
of a woman who refused to serve on a jury because of religious objections. In re
Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963), remanding the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court "for
further consideration in the light of Sherbert v. Verner." The state court subsequently
reversed the conviction. Even those who find these two decisions correct-and I do
not-might agree that People v. Woody, supra note 66, raises problems because of the
way in which it distinguishes Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). Polygamy,
said the California Supreme Court, had more serious consequences than peyote, and it
was not essential to the practice of the religion-a valid assertion only if one thinks
of religion in the narrowest sense of the physical ceremonies. Furthermore, the
California court reserves peyote only for true believers. In a companion habeas corpus
case, In re Grady, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912, 394 P.2d 728 (1964), it ruled that before a
white "self-styled peyote preacher" and "way shower" can be exempted from the drug
law he must prove that "his asserted belief was an honest and bona fide one." Since
a "factual question remains as to whether defendant actually engaged in good faith
in the practice of a religion," the court remanded the case to the superior court for a
trial on this question. Id. at 913, 394 P.2d at 729. The California court is skating on thin
constitutional ice: contrary to Reynolds, it allows a religious claim to win exemption
from otherwise illegal behavior; and it compounds the error by ordering an examination
into one of the most illusive topics in the world-the sincerity of another man's religious
beliefs. As Justice Jackson argued in his compelling dissent in Ballard v. United
States, 322 U.S. 79, 92-95 (1944), "this business of judicially examining other people's
faiths" raises insoluble problems.
124. 98 U.S. 168-69.
125. REYNoLDs, THE STORY OF THE BOOK OF MOammON (1957).
126. Waite to Rev. Dr. Walbridge, Jan. 20, 1879.
127. Harlan to Waite, undated, Legal File, Oct. Term 1878.
128. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1879, p. 4, col. 4.
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committed to an unambiguous constitutional principle: one man, one
woman.
III. THE A=R rEATH: THE MORMON CONTROL Acrs
George Reynolds was one of the few men ever convicted under
the Morrill Act. Anti-polygamy laws encountered the same sort of
reaction in the Utah Territory that federal civil rights laws encounter
today in the Mississippi delta. The fiery John Taylor, who succeeded
Brigham Young to the Presidency of the Church in 1880, counseled
a policy of resistance. Typical of the hierarchy's reaction to Reynolds
was the statement of Apostle Wilford Woodruff. "I will not,"
he announced in June, 1879, "desert my wives and my children and
disobey the commandments of God for the sake of accommodating the
public clamor of a nation steeped in sin and ripened for the damna-
tion of hell. I would rather go to prison and to death."12 In a
territory where three-quarters of the population were Mormon,
bigamy prosecution became a farce: polygamists went into hiding in
the "Underground," key witnesses disappeared, plural wives refused
to testify against their husbands, and sympathetic juries would not
convict.
But ultimately the Mormon resistance was no match for the federal
government. Congress, Court, and President had equal determination
and incomparably greater power. At almost the same moment that
"states' rights" was raising an impenetrable barrier to the enforcement
of Negro civil rights, "territorial" and "religious rights" crumbled
before the national determination to exterminate polygamy and the
would-be theocracy that had spawned it. An index of the intensity
of the federal commitment was the unprecedented action of President
Hayes' Secretary of State (and Morrison Waite's close friend) William
M. Evarts, in asking foreign governments to discourage Mormonism
and to prevent Mormon migration to America-one of the two occa-
sions that the United States has sought to interfere with the religious
practices of people living beyond its shores.130 Congress' specific
response to Mormon nullification of the Morrill Act was to enact two
pieces of legislation which in their harshness are reminiscent of the
anti-Communist laws of our generation; they are best described as the
Mormon Control Acts.1
3'
129. YouNG, op. cit. supra note 41, at 367.
130. 5 RoBERTs, op. cit. supra note 59, at 550-55. The other obvious instance was
the demand by United States military authorities at the end of World War II that the
Japanese disestablish their state religion, Shintoism, and that the Emperor renounce
his divine status.
131. A good summary of.the nineteenth-century anti-polygamy laws, which notes
their similarity to the post-World War II anti-Communist legislation, may be found
in Davis. The Polygamous Prelude, 6 AmER. J. LEGAL HsT. 1, 5-23 (1962).
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The Edmunds Act of 1882132 made it easier to secure bigamy
convictions by making it a crime for any male in the United States
territory merely to cohabit-not marry-with more than one woman. It
disqualified from jury service in bigamy and cohabitation prosecutions
all who believed in or practiced either polygamy or unlawful cohabita-
tion. In addition, convicted bigamists and "cohabs," as they were
quickly dubbed, lost their eligibility to vote and to hold public
office. Even more uncompromising was the Edmunds-Tucker Act of
1887:133 it revoked the Utah law incorporating the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints and dissolved the corporation; and it
escheated-confiscated-almost all of the Church's property except
that used solely for places of worship, parsonages, and graveyards.
The Edmunds-Tucker Act also repealed the Utah legislation granting
women the right to vote.134 Unlike the Civil Rights Enforcement Acts
of the previous decade, which, despite their name, went largely un-
enforced, the federal government enforced the Mormon Control Acts
with dedication. Nor, again unlike the case of the post-war civil rights
legislation, did the judiciary stand in the way.
Reynolds v. United States,135 with its unequivocal rejection of the
religious defense made of polygamy and its subsurface hostility to
Mormon theocracy, made the judicial outcome predictable. In fact,
in none of the eight Mormon cases to reach the Court between 1881
and 1890 were first amendment questions seriously examined. They
were not even hinted at in most cases, despite the fact that with our
libertarian assumptions we see the questions as literally screaming for
answers: generations do indeed differ. In Miles v. United States,13
the Mormons won one of their rare victories in the Supreme Court.
It unanimously ruled that the old common law rule (codified in the
Utah law) forbidding a wife to testify against her husband barred
the admitted and hence legal second wife of an alleged polygamist
from testifying with regard to his first and disputed marriage. The
Edmunds Act of 1882, requiring only proof of cohabitation, cleared
up this minor obstacle to effective prosecution of Mormon poly-
gamists.
Almost all of the other decisions went against the Mormons.
132. Act of March 22, 1882, 22 Stat. 31.
133. Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 635.
134. Since Mormon women voted at the Church's dictation, this was an obvious
attempt to weaken its political power. This action led to the kind of delicious ironies
which make American politics so fascinating: the Mormons, who kept their women in
a generally subservient status, loudly protested this blow at women's rights; Eastern
suffragists, who also opposed polygamy, joined anti-polygamy forces in demanding the
disfranchisement of Mormon women. Apparently they were not exercising their
newly-won right in a "responsible" manner. O'DEA, op. cit. supra note 40, at 249.
135. Supra note 124.
136. 103 U.S. 304 (1881).
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Murphy v. Ramsey137 unanimously upheld the Edmunds Act's dis-
franchisement of polygamists. Voting in the territories, the Court
solemnly intoned, was a "privilege" to be granted or denied within
"the legislative discretion of the Congress of the United States."'38
That the United States had sovereign dominion over the territories-
which the antebellum South had so vehemently denied-was a ques-
tion "no longer open to discussion":
For certainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and neces-
sary in the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth, fit to take
rank as one of the co-ordinate States of the Union, than that which seeks
to establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and
springing from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy
estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble
in our civilization; the best guaranty of that reverent morality which is the
source of all beneficent progress in social and political improvement. And
to this end, no means are more directly and immediately suitable than those
provided by this act, which endeavors to withdraw all political influence
from those who are practically hostile to its attainment.139
In this case the language was that of Justice Matthews, the reasoning
was that of Reynolds, but the Chief Justice never had the gift of an
artistic style. Waite could implicitly and dryly state the rule of "one
man, one woman"; Matthews could make it seem like a thing of poetic
beauty.
Clawson v. United States'40 sustained the provision in the Edmunds
Act which excluded polygamists and believers in polygamy from
grand juries in polygamy and cohabitation cases. Cannon v. United
States'41 presented a fascinating question: in Edmunds Act prosecu-
tions did the offense necessarily include sexual intercourse? Some
polygamists suspended sexual relations with their plural wives after
the act was passed. The Court answered no, saying that a Mormon
man had engaged in illicit cohabitation when he lived with two
women, even though he did not sleep with them. As long, said the
Court, as he ate with each of them one-third of the time and held
them out to the world as his wives he was in violation of the law.
Mormons were quick to point out that interpretations such as this
punished them for practicing their religion and morally looking after
their wives; a Gentile who merely engaged in casual adultery or who
137. 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
138. Id. at 45 (Matthews, J.). In this case the Court did invalidate certain election
regulations issued by the federal commission which had been appointed to implement
the voting provisions of the Edmunds Act; the Court ruled that the commissioners
had exceeded their statutory authority. Id. at 37.
139. Id. at 45.
140. 114 U.S. 477 (1885).
141. 116 U.S. 55 (1886).
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retained a separate mistress was not covered by the Edmunds Act.
Two Justices, Miller and Field, dissented, arguing that sexual inter-
course was a necessary element of guilt in cohabitation cases."
The Miller-Field dissent was based on common law views, not liber-
tarian sentiment. If adopted by the majority, it would have led to a
grossly illiberal end: to enforce the Edmunds Act federal police would
have had to extend their investigative work into Mormon bedrooms.
Snow v. United States143 was an unanimous decision that Congress
intended to foreclose direct Supreme Court review of territorial
supreme court rulings in cohabitation cases. In In re Snow,144 how-
ever, the entire Court agreed to issue writs of habeas corpus on
questions of personal freedom. It then held that the offense of
cohabitation is a continuous one, not a series of isolated acts, and
ordered the release from prison of a prominent Church leader who
had been given three separate consecutive sentences on the basis of
one continuous cohabitation. What little comfort this decision gave
the harrassed Mormons was dashed in 1890 by the Fuller Court. In
Davis v. Beason 45 not a single judge dissented from Justice Field's
opinion upholding the sanctions of the notorious Idaho Test Oath Act
which required all prospective voters to swear that they were not
members of any organization teaching or practicing polygamy.
More immediately disastrous to the Mormons, however, was the
decision in The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. United States'm which sustained the constitu-
tionality of the Edmunds-Tucker Act escheating most of the Church's
property. For probably the first time in his brilliant career Justice
Bradley, who spoke for the Court, allowed his fierce temper to spill
over into a judicial opinion. Polygamy, he declared, was a "barbarous
practice" and a "nefarious doctrine." The Mormon Church, as he saw
it, was an organized conspiracy to promote barbarism, spreading
propaganda that is "a blot on our civilization," "contrary to the spirit
of Christianity," and contrary to "the enlightened sentiment of man-
kind." As for the Mormons:
It is unnecessary here to refer to the past history of the sect, to their
defiance of the government authorities, to their attempt to establish an
independent community, to their efforts to drive from the territory all who
were not connected with them in communion and sympathy. The tale is
one of patience on the part of the American government and people, and
142. Id. at 71.
143. 118 U.S. 346 (1886). The Court also noted that it had erroneously overlooked
the jurisdictional question in Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55 (1885), and it
vacated its judgment and recalled its mandate in that case.
144. 120 U.S. 274 (1887).
145. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
146. 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
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of contempt of authority and resistance to law on the part of the Mormons.
Whatever persecutions they may have suffered in the early part of their
history, in Missouri and Illinois, they have no excuse for their persistent
defiance of law under the government of the United States.147
This time three Justices, including Stephen J. Field, dissented. The
Edmunds-Tucker Act hit Field at his most sensitive point: property
rights. As much as he despised Mormon polygamy, he could not
endorse a precedent which dissolved a corporation with vested rights
and turned its property over to the government.148
By the late 1880's the Mormon question was nearing its final solu-
tion, or rather, resolution by force majeure. Mormon women could no
longer vote. Twelve thousand men had been disfranchised under
the Edmunds Act.14 Something like six hundred to thirteen hundred
cohabs, numbering many Church leaders, had been sentenced to
prison terms.150 Hundreds of other cohabs were leading an uncertain
existence as fugitives in the Underground.151 In 1885 President Cleve-
land strengthened the federal garrison in Salt Lake City, and shortly
afterwards many of the Church's valuable properties-perhaps worth
one million dollars' 5 2--were in federal hands under the provisions of
the Edmunds-Tucker Act.
In the midst of these developments Morrison R. Waite made a sum-
mer vacation trip to the West that eventually took him to Utah.
Since the health of Amelia Waite, the Chief Justice's wife, was poor,
Waite frequently traveled alone or with his adult daughter, sending
Amelia detailed letters about his experiences. His summer trip in
1885 took him first to Oregon and Alaska, then to California; on his
return East he stopped for visits in Utah and Colorado. While in
California he called on an old friend from his boyhood days, William
Hill, who was a minor official in the California State Prison at San
Quentin. After Waite's departure, Hill sent him a letter urging him
to make sure that he visited Salt Lake City on a Sunday: "You will
learn more of the so-called religious aspects of Mornonism, by at-
tending one of their afternoon services at the Tabernacle, and seeing
and hearing their performances, than by a week's talk with both
Mormons and Gentiles." If possible," his friend cautioned, "attend
incog., for if they knew the Chief Justice were present, their speakers
147. Id. at 49.
148. Id. at 66-68.
149. BANcIoFT, IsToRY oF UTAH, 1540-1886, 688-89 (1889).
150. Estimates on the number of convicted offenders vary. O'DEA, op. cit. Supra
note 40, at 111; cf. 6 ROBERTs, op. cit. supra note 59, at 211.
151. YoUNG, op. cit. supra note 41, at 380-409, gives a vivid description of the
Mormon Underground.
152. Only estimates are available. ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 46, at 333 n.18;
O'DEA, op. cit. supra note 40, at 111.
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might restrain some of their fanatical and treasonable utterances....
They are a strange people." 53
Whether or not Waite visited the main Mormon Tabernacle is not
clear, but he did visit Utah with observant eyes. He could not help
raising his eyebrows at the thought of polygamous marriages, but the
letter he sent to his wife reveals the fair man he was. Waite painted
an honest picture of what he saw during his short visit: it was
factual and unadorned, much like his judicial opinions. He reported
that following some semi-official dinners and a reception given him
by the Territorial Governor,
Mr. Richards, a Mormon lawyer, and Mr. Caine, 154 the delegate from Utah,
drove us around the city and got us admission to the Mormon churches.
Then we drove out to Fort Douglass, 155 where I was saluted and lunched.
... The next day we left a little after 11. This was altogether as pleasant
a visit as we have made. Everybody was cordial and the city was pleasant
in every respect. In our ride to Fort Douglass we took in the penitentiary
which is a disgrace to humanity. The prisoners are herded in a pen and
are not kept at work at all. There are a good many of the Mormon digni-
taries confined there for a violation of the laws against polygamy. I saw
and had a talk with the Apostle Snow. 156 One of the ladies in my carriage
was a daughter of a polygamist. She is now the wife of a leading lawyer and
a very intelligent and interesting woman. Her father157 has been a Bishop,
and is now one of the directors of the Union Pacific R. R. He is also the
manager of the Utah Central and a man of wealth. He lives, however, in
obedience to the present laws of Congress, and has been repudiated by the
Mormon Hierarchy. The daughter spoke freely of the situation, and her
brothers and half brothers. She did not, however, attempt to conceal her
dislike of the system, and said it was a disturbing element, whenever it
appeared. She did not say so in so many words, but it was clear she knew
all was not as smooth as it might be inside the polygamous households.
I was very glad I had the opportunity of seeing her.
158
The author of the Reynolds opinion was not a hater, and he showed
no animus against the Mormon people. Quite the contrary, his atti-
tude was one of interest and of genuine sympathy.
153. William Hill to Waite, Aug. 28, 1886.
154. John T. Caine, a Mormon who was the Utah delegate to Congress.
155. A misspelling of Fort Douglas, a federal army post on the eastern side of Salt
Lake City.
156. Lorenzo Snow, who between 1898 and 1901 served as the fifth president of
the Church. In 1887 the Waite Court ordered Snow's release from prison. See text
accompanying note 144- supra. One wonders if the Chief Justice in conference
described to his colleagues the "disgrace" at Fort Douglas when they discussed the
Snow case.
157. Almost certainly Bishop John Sharp of Salt Lake City, who in 1885 confessed
his guilt as a polygamist, promised to obey the federal laws, and was let off with a mild
sentence. See ANDEnsoN, op. cit. supra "note 46, at 275 n.11, 317; YouNG, op. cit.
supra note 41, at 360-61.
158. Waite to Amelia Waite, Sept. 19, 1886.
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Within four years of Chief Justice Waite's visit the Mormon hier-
archy raised the flag of surrender. Church President John Taylor,
the bitter-end resister who had stood in the Illinois jail with Joseph
Smith when the Prophet was murdered, died in 1887. The uncom-
promising federal campaign, as Waite's letter suggested, was bringing
results. By the mid-eighties a growing number of Mormons were
defecting on the polygamy issue; and Taylor's passing hastened the
process. The final Mormon hopes died with the Supreme Court deci-
sion sustaining the confiscatory Edmunds-Tucker Act.159 On Septem-
ber 24, 1890, Wilford Woodruff, the new President of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints-who only eleven years earlier had
said he preferred death to abandoning polygamy-issued a "Mani-
festo":
In as much as laws have been enacted by Congress forbidding plural
marriages, which laws have been pronounced constitutional by the court
of last resort, I hereby declare my intention to submit to those laws and
to use my influence with the members of the Church over which I preside
to have them do likewise.... I now publicly declare that my advice to the
Latter-day Saints is to refrain from contracting any marriage forbidden by
the law of the land.'
60
The hierarchy unanimously supported this move, and three years
later Woodruff declared that the Manifesto was divinely inspired.
God, he claimed, had shown him a vision (a vision which certainly
comported with reality!) portraying the dire consequences that would
befall the Church if it did not abandon polygamy.
1' 1
The pieces now fell together in quick order. Despite the suspicion
of the more rabid anti-Mormon Gentiles in Utah, who argued that the
Manifesto was a trick, both sides were ready to compromise. Upon
becoming Church President, Woodruff had sent emissaries to Wash-
ington to sound out congressmen and executive officials on the
possibilities of a bargain in which the Church would renounce poly-
gamy. While there was no official agreement, the Church and the
federal government clearly reached an informal understanding.
162
Woodruff released his Manifesto, and in 1893 and 1894 Presidents
Harrison and Cleveland issued proclamations of amnesty and pardon
that ended the punishment of the convicted polygamists. Meanwhile,
the Utah Territorial Assembly had in 1892 passed an anti-cohabitation
law, and. the Mormon-controlled convention, which drafted a proposed
state constitution, adopted irrevocable provisions forever outlawing
159. The Late Corporation of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, supra note 146.
160. YouNG, op. cit. supra note 41, at 376-77.
161. Id. at 377.
162. WE ST, op. cit. supra note 39, at 340-41.
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polygamy in Utah. Congress passed joint resolutions returning the
Church's real estate; the territorial courts cooperated by interpreting
the Edmunds-Tucker Act in such a way as to facilitate the return of
other Mormon properties now that the remaining purposes of the
Church were lawful.1
On its seventh application, in 1896, Utah was granted statehood.
Although there were some minor difficulties for a few years, 164 the
settlement was genuine. The Church gave up polygamy and its dream
of a theocracy in the desert; in turn it was left free to prosper in
the twentieth century in ways that must surely please the departed
spirits of Joseph Smith and Brigham Young. The Mormons still re-
mained a religiously distinctive and "peculiar people," yet in one
crucial respect they revealed how thoroughly American they really
were: the Mormons knew how to strike a political compromise before
it became too late-prudence triumphed over principle, so that other
religious principles might survive.
The conflict had been a bitter one, doubly so because the libertarian
habits which today tend to civilize struggles between groups were
often unpracticed by nineteenth-century Americans. Rights and
wrongs need not be-and probably cannot be-tallied. If one concedes
the power of society to legislate effectively general moral standards
that reflect the deepest instincts of its people and their culture, then
theocracy and Mormon polygamy, to borrow a recently popular
expression, were simply outside the "mainstream" of American life.
The theocracy was short-lived; its demise began in 1857 when Brigham
Young was ousted as Governor, though theocratic elements were
strongly evident for a long time thereafter. It was polygamy which
proved to be the real sticking point in the Mormon relationship with
their Gentile antagonists. Like slavery, it was a peculiar institution,
and like slavery it became morally intolerable to the cultural, religious,
and political leaders of America. The methods used to eradicate
polygamy were not pretty; neither were the ones used by Lincoln to
save the Union and end slavery. Lincoln, it needs to be added, once
said of the Mormons, "Let them alone."165 He hoped to do as he did
when, as a boy in Illinois, he had farmed in a clearing with occasional
tree stumps: "I plow around them."166 But Lincoln too later favored
"somehow" calling the Mormons into "obedience," and as President
he signed the anti-polygamy Morrill Act.
167
163. DA Vis, op. cit. supra note 131, at 17-18.
164. See YoUNG, op. cit. supra note 41, at 378-79, 410-42.
165. 5 ROBERTS, op. cit. supra note 59, at 70.
166. AMONG THE MORMONS viii (Mulder & Mortensen eds. 1958).
167. ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 46, at 167. Although he fails to document the
assertion, WEsr, op. cit. supra note 39, states that Lincoln believed the anti-polygamy
bill to be unconstitutional.
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Utah aspired to statehood, and her geographic location, her eco-
nomic relationships, and most of her cultural values placed her in
the Union. She could not be plowed around. That polygamy was
the obstructive stump is made clear by the speedy settlement that
followed the Manifesto. Once polygamy was uprooted, the Mormons
were free to take their full and rightful place within American society.
It also needs to be added that, for all their unhappy early history,
the Mormons did flourish in the United States. They now count in
their ranks nearly one-and-a-half million saints,168 many of whom
live outside of Utah and in foreign lands where an active missionary
movement carries the messages of Joseph Smith and Brigham Young.
Within the loose framework of restrictions set by a minimum
common morality embodied in our laws and public health and wel-
fare regulations, there is, after all, extraordinary religious freedom
in America for a truly amazing variety of sects, creeds-and religious
practices. In the nineteenth century it took sixty years for Mormons
and Gentiles to learn how to accommodate themselves to each
other. By contrast, in the twentieth century the process of mutual
adjustment between society and new and "heretical" creeds has been
far less painful. The Christian Scientists 169 and especially the Jeho-
vah's Witnesses 17 0 faced harrassment and a sort of local option
persecution in their first two or three decades. Even so, their general
experiences were much less trying than those of the Mormons, and
today both sects are well integrated into American life. Even Elijah
Muhammad's Black Muslims-many of whose values and practices
reek of the bourgeois pieties-need not be permanently estranged
from their surroundings.' 7' A long range improvement in Negro-white
relations would likely bring a decline or "re-interpretation" of the
Muslims' exotic eschatology (no more exotic than that of the Mormons
168. Id. at 354.
169. BRADNmr, CmusmrN ScIENcE TODAY, PowER, POUCY, PnAMcCE 3-11, 250-66
(1958).
170. MANwunwG, BENDER UNTo CAESAR, TnE FLAG-SALUTE CONMOVERSY (1962).
171. See generally the excellent study, ESSLEN-UDoM, BLACK NATIONALISNt, A
SancH FOR AN IDENTITY In AIMERCA (paperbound ed. 1964). The Muslims and the
federal government have clashed over the question of military service. Id. at 292-95.
Some state prisons have denied prisoners the right to purchase Black Muslim religious
publications or to conduct services. Judicial decisions so far have sustained these
highly dubious rulings. See In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, 361
P.2d 417 (1961); Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165 (1963). The N.Y. Times, May 18,
1963, p. 13, col. 5, reported that five Negro pupils were suspended from a public
school in Elizabeth, N.J., for three months because, as followers of "Islamic teach-
ings," they refused to salute the United States flag. After a few days, the pupils were
apparently reinstated. The ruling in the second flag salute case, West Virginia Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), leaves little doubt that the first
amendments guarantee of freedom of political expression (and thus of non-expression
as well) bars states from requiring a compulsory flag salute.
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once appeared) and an accommodation with the only society in
which they have a realistic future.
In the making of these adjustments between religious sects and
secular society Chief Justice Waite's opinion in Reynolds v. United
States serves as one of the guiding constitutional and political prin-
ciples: a religious claim under the free exercise clause of the first
amendment is not necessarily a bar to the enforcement of general
social and political regulations. But the Waite opinion, though written
in a pre-libertarian era and despite its undercurrent of hostility to
Mormon polygamy, is not illiberal. Certainly in its sober discussion of
the issues and in its moderate conclusions, it is an opinion notably
superior to those of Bradley and Field-two judges commonly ranked
as "greater" than their chief-in the Mormon cases of 1890. Thanks
to the Chief Justice's ,common sense use of the materials given him
by an eminent historian, George Bancroft, the Reynolds opinion has
stature as a leading judicial precedent. While safeguarding broad
social interests, it emphasizes with equal force the values of religious
liberty which Jefferson and Madison represented, and it endorses
their sensible insistence that church and state be separated. In its
immediate effect the decision removed the constitutional underpinning
from the last of the "twin relics of barbarism." It has a broader
significance however: Waite's opinion in Reynolds v. United States
does justice to the claims of Caesar and to the claims of God.
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